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Reflective Equilibrium* 
Carl Knight, University of Glasgow 
 
1. Introduction 
The method of reflective equilibrium focuses on the relationship between principles 
and judgments. Principles are relatively general rules for comprehending the area of 
enquiry. Judgments are our intuitions or commitments, ‘at all levels of generality’ 
(Rawls 1975: 8), regarding the subject matter. The basic idea of reflective 
equilibrium is to bring principles and judgments into accord. This can be achieved 
by revising the principles and/or the judgments. For instance, if I am considering 
the principle that it is always wrong to lie, but have the judgment that it would not 
be wrong to lie in order to save a life, I can reach equilibrium by either revising the 
principle or revising the judgment. 
Reflective equilibrium is the most widely used methodology in contemporary 
moral and political philosophy (Sinnot-Armstrong et al 2010: 246; Varner 2012: 
11). It has even been suggested that it is ‘the only defensible method’ (Scanlon 
2003: 149). Its popularity is undoubtedly strongly influenced by John Rawls’ use of 
it in his seminal A Theory of Justice, published in 1971.1 However, the method 
precedes this, and extends to other fields. For instance, Nelson Goodman wrote 
regarding induction that ‘[t]he process of justification is the delicate one of making 
mutual adjustments between rules and accepted inferences; and in the agreement 
reached lies the only justification needed for either’ (Goodman 1965: 64). Some 
fields, by contrast, do not seem as amenable to the method of reflective 
equilibrium. Within linguistics, for instance, native speakers’ judgments of 
grammaticality cannot generally be replaced as moral judgments can (Daniels 1996: 
ch. 4). Although most writers treat reflective equilibrium as unproblematic within 
empirical sciences (Daniels 1996: 31-33; Cummins 1998; Welch 2014: 4; see also 
McDermott 2008), adjustment of empirical judgments also seems to be subject to 
stronger constraints than those that apply to moral judgments (see Singer 2005: 
345). 
Indeed, here there seems to be a significant difference between normative political 
theory and empirical political science. A normative political theorist who, to her 
surprise, finds that a confidently held moral judgment conflicts with an otherwise 
compelling principle (or set of principles) is free to reject that judgment precisely 
because it conflicts with the favoured principle. But it would be quite improper for 
a confidently-held empirical judgment to be abandoned simply because it turned 
                                                          
* In Adrian Blau (ed.), Methods in Analytical Political Theory (Cambridge University Press, 2017). 
1 Jo Wolff (2013: 808) notes that, of the papers collected in the first two series of Politics, Philosophy, and 
Society, Rawls’ was unique in aiming to defend a substantive position, and in deploying a distinctive 
methodology to positive effect. 
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out not to fit with the investigator’s pet hypothesis. Full reflective equilibrium, with 
judgments adjusted at will just as principles are, is primarily the reserve of 
normative political theory. It is with normative political theory that this chapter will 
be concerned. 
I first look at normative political judgments (section 2) before considering the role 
of principles, arguments, devices of representation and background theory in wide 
reflective equilibrium (section 3). I then consider two of the main challenges to the 
method (section 4), and show how to use it to deliberate about substantive political 
principles (section 5). I conclude with an extended example of the method in 
action (section 6). 
 
2. Judgments 
The starting point for reflective equilibrium is our judgments. We cannot, however, 
use just any judgments. For instance, judgments made ‘in the heat of the moment’ 
would not be a reliable basis for equilibrium. Considered judgments are what we 
need. These are ‘those judgments in which our moral capacities are most likely to 
be displayed without distortion’ (Rawls 1999: 42). 
Most writers, including Rawls (1999: 42), suppose that, in order to count as 
considered, judgments should be held with confidence. Indeed, Rawls often uses 
‘convictions’ as a synonym for ‘judgments’ (Rawls 1975: 8; 2005: 24, 26, 28, 151, 
156). This ‘confidence constraint’ seems to me quite gratuitous (Knight 2006: 207-
208). If I have the firm conviction that the state should protect its citizens from 
terrorism, and also believe, less firmly, that individuals have a right to privacy, a 
right to not be subject to pre-trial detention beyond a certain duration, and a right 
to a public trial, the confidence constraint would seem to require that my 
numerous but less firmly held concerns about individual rights be set aside. But 
this is to give free reign to the one firm conviction, with the upshot that the 
principle(s) arrived at in reflective equilibrium will allow almost any breach of civil 
rights in the name of public protection. This is in contradiction of the majority of 
the judgments I hold and (most likely) my overall view. 
Undoubtedly, a firmly held judgment should generally carry more weight in our 
deliberations than a less firmly one. But reflective equilibrium automatically does 
that, as we are presumably more likely to give up our less firmly held judgments in 
the face of opposing judgments or principles. If we don’t, that’s because it turns 
out that the less firmly held judgments had something going for them. Maybe they 
individually or collectively capture something that, on reflection, we consider to be 
important. Thus, I think we should reject the confidence constraint. 
A different constraint has sometimes been assumed, including in my earlier work 
(Knight 2006: 207). This specifies that our considered judgments do not display 
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errors of reasoning, such as logical inconsistencies, or empirical errors. Some 
writers go further, suggesting that we should disregard judgments that we don’t 
have evidence for, as they are not epistemic assets (Gaus 1996: 86; Kelly and 
McGrath 2010: 347-354). Should we, then, endorse an ‘epistemic constraint’, 
requiring that only justified or warranted judgments, or (more minimally) only 
those that lack errors, are admitted to the reflective equilibrium procedure? 
Though this may seem like simple common sense, I doubt it. Consider first the 
stronger version of the constraint, which requires justification or warrant for a 
judgment. Evidence can be rather thin on the ground when we are dealing even 
with firmly held judgments. If I consider some political judgment that I hold very 
firmly, such as the judgment that no fellow citizen should avoidably starve, it is 
hard to point to anything that can really count as evidence for that belief in the 
relevant sense. I might point out that my compatriot will suffer pain, reduced 
capability, and eventually death, but these empirical facts alone cannot really be 
evidence for the normative judgment I am making. It seems that, in a case like this, 
the judgment itself is foundational. My judgment seems pre-theoretically plausible 
to me, and that is sufficient to grant it ‘independent credibility’ (Hooker 2012: 23). 
This does not mean that it has any weight in my final principles, but it is enough 
for it to be granted admission to the reflective equilibrium process. It is there that 
the credentials of our judgments are really tested, by seeing how well they fit with 
our other judgments and the most plausible principles, in light of the most 
compelling arguments we can muster. 
What then of the less demanding version of the epistemic constraint, which 
requires merely the absence of outright error? Surely we can reject some judgments 
as clearly erroneous. But even this constraint might be thought to be excessively 
demanding in that it goes beyond providing ‘conditions favorable for deliberation 
and judgment in general’ (Rawls 1999: 42) and actually limits the admissible 
content of judgments. Furthermore, exactly what qualifies as an error of reasoning 
and what qualifies as an empirical error is controversial. We could consider these 
issues in piecemeal fashion prior to entering reflective equilibrium. But this is 
counterproductive as we have no way of knowing whether these isolated 
speculations will be consistent with the most plausible overall position. We should 
instead consider these issues holistically, as pieces in the jigsaw that is the coherent 
view of the conceptual terrain that we aim to arrive at in reflective equilibrium. 
(Specifically, these issues are settled through consideration of relevant background 
theories – see section 3 below.) Reflective equilibrium eschews the essentialist 
notion ‘that we can determine the nature of certain facets of these inquiries in 
advance of the inquiries themselves, and that nothing that comes about in inquiry 
will change those facets’ (Walden 2013: 255). The epistemic constraint, even in its 
minimal form, seems to put the cart before the horse, and should be discarded. 
Considered judgments are just those made in ‘conditions favorable for deliberation 
and judgment in general’. 
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3. Wide reflective equilibrium 
Suppose that you have arrived at your set of considered judgments. You might first 
use these to reach narrow reflective equilibrium, in which ‘one is to be presented 
with only those descriptions which more or less match one’s existing judgments 
except for minor discrepancies’ (Rawls 1999: 43; see also Rawls 2005: 8 n. 8). 
Narrow reflective equilibrium is in essence an effort to systematize an agent’s pre-
theoretical views. As such, it has limited epistemic value. Were someone to ask you 
what justification you have for your principles, you do not have much of a reply. 
To be sure, the narrow reflective equilibrium principles might be an improvement 
from your perspective on the bare intuitions you started out with. But you can 
hardly say that your principles are well justified where they are just a direct 
expression of your pre-theoretical intuitions. 
The more interesting version of the method is wide reflective equilibrium. Rawls 
describes this in very demanding terms: ‘one is to be presented with all possible 
descriptions to which one might plausibly conform one’s judgments together with 
all relevant philosophical arguments’ (Rawls 1999: 43). So for wide reflective 
equilibrium to be reached, you must consider all principles (and combinations of 
principles) that you might accept. As one way in which you may conform your 
judgments to principles is to change your judgments, this means that you must 
consider every principle in every combination with every other principle! 
Unsurprisingly, Rawls does not attempt to fully satisfy this unachievable standard, 
resolving in A Theory of Justice to compare only his own ‘principles and arguments 
with a few other familiar views’ (Rawls 1999: 43). For all practical purposes, it will 
undoubtedly be necessary to narrow our equilibrium in this way. Nevertheless, I 
think there is great value in keeping in mind that wide reflective equilibrium is an 
ideal. It sets the bar high. Though the theorist will inevitably only consider a few 
principles, this is not because that is all the method of reflective equilibrium 
requires for a full justification to be provided. It should always be kept in mind that 
consideration of more principles would provide a fuller justification. Furthermore, 
if we have to cut corners, we should do so in the way least harmful to the strength 
of the final justification. This means, for example, ensuring that we at least 
consider the most compelling rival principles, rather than satisfying ourselves with 
seeing off straw men. 
Reflective equilibrium can be interpreted as providing an ecumenical answer to a 
long-standing problem in epistemology. The ordinary way of justifying beliefs is 
inferential and linear: belief A justifies belief B, which justifies belief C, and so on. 
The problem here is rather obvious. As the chain of inference cannot go on 
infinitely, it seems that none of our beliefs will be justified. There are two ways out 
of this infinite justificatory regress. Foundationalism denies that all justification is 
inferential – for example, A might be justified by something other than another 
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belief. Coherentism denies that all justification is linear – for example, C might be 
justified by A (Brink 1989: 109). A large majority of writers see reflective 
equilibrium as a coherentist method (Brink 1989: 134; Daniels 1996: 60-61; 
Tersman 2008: 398-400; Maffetone 2010: 142-145), while a few see it as 
foundationalist (DePaul 1986; Ebertz 1993). In my view it clearly contains 
elements of both approaches. Foundationalism can be seen to be present as I 
would, according to the method, be justified in favouring one possible coherent set 
of principles and considered judgments to another purely because the former 
coincides with my actual considered judgments. Coherentism cannot explain this, 
as each set is identical as regards coherentist non-linear justificatory chains. But 
coherentism is evidently also present, as the method says that the fact that some 
judgment (or principle) coheres with the rest of our beliefs counts in its favour.  
As I have mentioned, Rawls requires not only that principles be considered, but 
relevant arguments as well. We could reach equilibrium without arguments, but 
coherence among beliefs that have not been subjected to serious scrutiny would be 
of limited justificatory value. This introduces several new complexities. First, there 
are arguments that directly support or undermine judgments and principles. For 
instance, when contemplating utilitarianism, the objection that utilitarianism seems 
in some circumstances to permit slavery or knowing punishment of the innocent 
should be considered (Varner 2012: 11). Second, there are structures for framing 
our deliberations that go beyond single arguments, which Rawls terms ‘devices of 
representation’ (Rawls 2005: 23-28). These typically provide special circumstances 
for principle selection, with the parameters of those circumstances set by the 
theorist’s judgments regarding what is reasonable or rational. Rawls’ original 
position is the best known example within analytical political philosophy. There are 
many more examples in contemporary work (Ackerman 1980; Gauthier 1986; 
Dworkin 2000: Ch. 2) and, arguably, older social contract theory (Hobbes, Locke) 
and ideal observer theory (Hume, Smith). Finally, there are ‘background theories’ 
(Daniels 1996: 22-23), which are drawn upon by both the direct arguments and the 
background theories, and themselves tested for intuitive appeal. For instance, if a 
theory of the separateness of persons were found compelling, it might be used 
both to undermine certain principles, as Rawls (1999: 23-24) seems to argue is true 
of utilitarianism. The various elements of wide reflective equilibrium are 
summarized in Table 1. 
Element Scope Role Examples 
Judgments Specific or 
general 
Primary subject 
of equilibrium 
Racial discrimination 
is wrong; all 
individuals have equal 
moral worth 
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Principles General Primary subject 
of equilibrium 
The difference 
principle; equal moral 
worth principle 
Direct arguments Specific Argumentation Rawls’ intuitive 
argument; the levelling 
down objection 
Devices of 
representation 
General Argumentation The original position; 
the ideal observer 
Background theories General Argumentation Theories of the 
person; social theory 
Table 1. Elements of wide reflective equilibrium 
In practice, it may not always be easy to distinguish the different elements, and it is 
not absolutely essential to do so. For instance, the table gives an example of a 
principle (equal moral worth principle) that is more or less a restatement of a 
judgment (all individuals have equal moral worth). As judgments and principles, 
qua judgments and principles, do not receive privileged epistemic status – ‘[o]ur 
“intuitions” are simply opinions: our philosophical theories are the same’ (Lewis 
1983: x; see also Freeman 2007: 33; Mandle 2009: 171-172) – there is no problem 
with the boundaries between them being fuzzy or overlapping.2 Judgments and 
principles are only distinguished here as this is a familiar and often helpful way of 
arranging our thoughts. Likewise, and as indicated in the table, the direct 
arguments, devices of representation, and background theories are really just 
subsets of one big category of ‘argumentation’. They do not need to be 
systematically separated as none has priority over any other. Some of the 
argumentation elements may even be absent in the creation of particular equilibria; 
for instance, the extended example in section 6 below does not refer to device of 
representation. 
 
4. Challenges 
As the most widespread approach to theory selection in moral and political 
philosophy, the method of reflective equilibrium has faced its share of critical 
attention. In this section I consider a couple of the more significant challenges. 
A common complaint with the method is that it relies entirely on the quality of the 
judgments which form a central part of the equilibrium (Brandt 1979: 20; 
Williamson 2007: 244-246). Advocates of the method typically build their examples 
around highly plausible judgments, such as Rawls’ convictions about the 
                                                          
2 Welch even defends a radical version of reflective equilibrium in which ‘there are no considered judgments to 
consider’ (Welch 2014: 14). 
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wrongness of religious intolerance and racial subordination. But if someone starts 
with implausible or even repugnant judgments, there is, critics claim, nothing to 
stop the method from generating implausible conclusions. The point is put clearly 
by Thomas Kelly and Sarah McGrath (2010: 346-347): 
it is a good objection to a method if it turns out that impeccably following that 
method could lead one to views that are unreasonable. It follows from this that if 
beginning from all and only one’s considered judgments, and from there 
achieving wide reflective equilibrium without making any “downstream” 
mistakes, is sufficient for impeccably executing the method of reflective 
equilibrium, then the method is not correct. The problem is that something 
might very well qualify as a considered judgment, when that notion is 
understood in anything like the way it is understood in the broadly Rawlsian 
tradition, and yet be utterly lacking in rational credibility.  
This is illustrated with the observation that there is nothing to stop ‘[o]ne is 
morally required to occasionally kill randomly’ from counting as a considered 
judgment. Kelly and McGrath therefore conclude that reflective equilibrium is an 
inadequate method. 
This critique seems to be misdirected in several respects. First, Kelly and McGrath 
focus on considered judgments to such a degree that reflective equilibrium proper 
falls out of their picture entirely. They seem to take it as given that the final set of 
principles will simply be direct expressions of the initial considered judgments. 
While that may be more or less true of narrow reflective equilibrium, it is unlikely 
to be true of wide reflective equilibrium. Sustained consideration of competing 
principles, supporting arguments, devices of representation, and background 
theories is extremely likely to expunge judgments that are ‘utterly lacking in rational 
credibility’,3 in which case the alleged problem does not arise.  
Second, it is not clear that we have actually been shown a case in which 
‘impeccably following’ the method of reflective equilibrium ‘lead[s] one to views 
that are unreasonable’. In Kelly and McGrath’s example, the random killing 
judgment is held initially. So it is not the case that the method ‘leads’ anyone to this 
judgment. Rather, they had the judgment to begin with. If there is a complaint to 
be had here, it is with the life history that has resulted in such an absurd judgment 
being formed. 
Finally, I doubt that it actually is ‘a good objection to a method if it turns out that 
impeccably following that method could lead one to views that are unreasonable’. 
Kelly and McGrath (2010: 327-328) support this claim with the following example: 
Suppose that, prior to embarking upon the systematic study of fruit flies, one 
held various baseless opinions about their nature. If one then devoted oneself 
                                                          
3 Kelly and McGrath seem to concede a similar point regarding empirical sciences – see the lengthy quote 
given two paragraphs below. 
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to the study of fruit flies, and impeccably followed the best scientific 
procedures we have for arriving at accurate views about their nature, we would 
expect those earlier baseless opinions to be filtered out or corrected at some 
stage in the inquiry. In the unlikely event that some of those opinions were 
among the views that one held after having impeccably following our best 
scientific methods, then, we submit, those beliefs would no longer be 
unreasonable ones to hold. 
The conclusion may seem plausible here on account of misleading features of the 
case. In particular, the ‘baseless opinions’ are so sparsely described that we have no 
way of grasping whether they might be held reasonably or not. To really test the 
central underlying claim here that application of the scientific method, unlike 
reflective equilibrium, removes unreasonable beliefs, we should adjust the scientific 
baseless opinions, so that they are as vivid as their moral counterpart – the 
judgment that ‘[o]ne is morally required to occasionally kill randomly’. So suppose 
that the baseless beliefs about fruit flies are the following: fruit flies originate from 
specific acts of divine creation; these acts occurred within the last 10,000 years and 
are literally described in scripture; it is a matter of religious duty to disregard all 
countervailing evidence regarding the origins of fruit flies. I think it highly plausible 
that these views are unreasonable, and that ‘devot[ing] oneself to the study of fruit 
flies, and impeccably follow[ing] the best scientific procedures we have for arriving 
at accurate views about their nature’ does not stop these views from being 
unreasonable. The lesson to draw from this is that neither the method of reflective 
equilibrium nor the scientific method are guaranteed to rid people of unreasonable 
beliefs. But that doesn’t change the fact that both are more likely than alternatives 
to provide individuals with reasonable beliefs, by exposing them to the most 
compelling evidence that is available in their respective fields. 
This leads us to the second challenge. Several writers have claimed not that 
reflective equilibrium struggles with implausible idiosyncratic judgments, like the 
random killing judgment, but with the fact that our judgments are systematically 
undermined (Brandt 1979: 21-22; Hare 1981: 12). Peter Singer emphasizes that our 
moral judgments have largely arisen through an evolutionary process. For example, 
the common sense idea that we have stronger duties towards relatives can be 
explained on the basis that the corresponding genes ‘are more likely to survive and 
spread among social mammals than genes that do not lead to preferences for one’s 
relatives that are typically proportional to the proximity of the relationship’ (Singer 
2005: 334; see also Singer 1974). It is no surprise, then, that brain scans suggest 
that our moral judgments often do not seem to be informed by reason, but are 
rather an immediate emotional response (Singer 2005: 339-342). Individuals will 
stick to their judgment even where they end up rejecting the reasons they initially 
give for it (Singer 2005: 337-338). This modern scientific understanding of ‘how we 
make moral judgments casts serious doubt on the method of reflective equilibrium’ 
according to Singer (2005: 348):  
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There is little point in constructing a moral theory designed to match 
considered moral judgments that themselves stem from our evolved responses 
to the situations in which we and our ancestors lived during the period of our 
evolution as social mammals, primates, and finally, human beings. We should, 
with our current powers of reasoning and our rapidly changing circumstances, 
be able to do better than that. 
 
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the evolutionary picture that Singer paints 
is correct. I would not see this as a threat to the method of reflective equilibrium. 
Singer is, in effect, presenting a background theory that should be considered when 
an individual is undergoing reflective equilibrium.4 If the background theory is 
compelling, as I suspect it might be, that may cause individuals to treat their moral 
judgments differently, taking care to consider whether a judgment might amount to 
an evolved emotional response that should be set aside. 
 
Singer (2005: 347) anticipates a response along these lines, and replies as follows: 
 
Admittedly, it is possible to interpret the model of reflective equilibrium so 
that it takes into account any grounds for objecting to our intuitions, 
including those that I have put forward. Norman Daniels has argued 
persuasively for this ‘‘wide’’ interpretation of reflective equilibrium. If the 
interpretation is truly wide enough to countenance the rejection of all our 
ordinary moral beliefs, then I have no objection to it. The price for avoiding 
the inbuilt conservatism of the narrow interpretation, however, is that 
reflective equilibrium ceases to be a distinctive method of doing normative 
ethics. Where previously there was a contrast between the method of 
reflective equilibrium and ‘‘foundationalist’’ attempts to build an ethical 
system outward from some indubitable starting point, now foundationalism 
simply becomes the limiting case of a wide reflective equilibrium. 
 
Here Singer claims that reflective equilibrium would have to rely not just on the 
moderate, revisable foundationalism referred to earlier, but rather on a stronger 
‘special foundationalism’ (Harman 2003: 415) that identifies certain ethical truths as 
unchallengeable. Were that true, it would certainly be the case that reflective 
equilibrium had been stripped of its distinctive features (in particular, mutual 
adjustment of judgments and principles). But it is not true. Singer says that the 
interpretation should be ‘truly wide enough to countenance the rejection of all our 
ordinary moral beliefs’. Reflective equilibrium is this wide (Sandberg and Juth 
2011: 222). However, Singer’s conclusion implicitly assumes that countenancing 
the rejection of ordinary moral beliefs will result in (1) their wholesale rejection and 
(2) the adoption of some mysterious ‘indubitable starting point’, rather than a set 
                                                          
4 Singer later seems to make this concession; see de Lazari-Radek and Singer 2012: 29-31. 
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of revised moral beliefs subject to reflective equilibrium’s usual ongoing epistemic 
tests. Both of these assumptions are quite gratuitous. A more likely result of 
considering Singer’s background theory is a reduction in the weight we are willing 
to assign to judgments that have a vividly personal quality, such as judgments 
favouring family members or judgments assigning special opprobrium to harms 
inflicted in a direct physical way, as these are likely to have evolutionary origins 
(Tersman 2008: 397-398). There may be a corresponding increase in the weight we 
are willing to assign to universal or impartial judgments, which have less (or 
possibly no) evolutionary baggage. Reforming our judgments in this way would not 
mean that ‘the ‘‘data’’ that a sound moral theory is supposed to match have 
become so changeable that they can play, at best, a minor role in determining the 
final shape of the normative moral theory’ (Singer 2005: 349). On the contrary, 
shifting judgments play a full role as part of a ‘dynamic dialectical process’ (Brink 
2014: 688). 
 
5. How to use the method of reflective equilibrium 
In this section I suggest some steps in the process of reflective equilibrium. 
The first step in reaching equilibrium is making considered judgments on 
the topic at hand. These are what I take to be the requirements for considered 
judgments (Rawls 1999: 42): 
1) No upset, fright, tiredness, or intoxication. This may seem obvious, but there 
are plenty of cases where political theorists do their work when subject 
to personal distress, or to a deadline, or late at night, or (so I hear) over a 
glass of wine or two. 
2) No conflicts of interest. Individual political theorists often would gain more 
under one set of principles rather than another. Even though there is 
effectively no chance that the principles are going to be put into effect, 
there may still be a psychological effect. This is actually a rather hard 
problem to get around – surely we cannot prohibit work on social 
justice, on the basis that any principle would be likely to have effects on 
theorists’ incomes. Perhaps the best we can do is be aware of our 
possible subconscious biases, and exercise particular caution when 
rejecting principles that do not serve our self-interest. 
3) The ability to reach the correct decision. This requires at least minimal 
standards of competency. It would be possible to reach a reflective 
equilibrium about a topic within political theory that one had never read 
anything about, but it is unlikely to have much epistemic value (see 
Scanlon 2014: 82).5 
                                                          
5 It might be objected that this requirement seems incompatible with my rejection of the ‘epistemic constraint’ 
in section 2 above. This objection misses the importance of the distinction between constraints on the 
contents of judgments (such as the epistemic constraint) and constraints on the circumstances of judgments. 
The former type of constraint is otiose, as what it attempts to do (for instance, justification) is done more 
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4) The desire to reach the correct decision. The individual must be motivated to 
arrive at justified principles. People (almost?) invariably come to political 
theory with a set of preconceived ideas about politics. This is fine 
provided that the individual is open-minded, being willing to alter their 
views in response to arguments. The fact that one is on record defending 
a position should be no barrier to rejecting that position, even where this 
might prove inconvenient or embarrassing.6 
 
In short, the first step is to make sure that you undertake the process of reflective 
equilibrium in the Rawlsian ‘conditions favorable for deliberation and judgment in 
general’. The conditions established in the first step must be maintained 
throughout the process. 
The second step is to draw up a list of the main contending principles on 
whatever topic you are considering. If you can think of any compelling new 
principles, these should also be added to the list. There is no specific number of 
principles that one should aim for, but as a general rule and time permitting, more 
is better. It should be remembered that, while it is usually impractical in a work of 
political theory of 5,000 or 10,000 words to discuss a large number of principles, 
there is no ‘word limit’ when it comes to considering principles prior to, or during, 
the actual writing process. Even if one only discusses two or three principles in 
detail in the final product, you may have considered and rejected many more 
during the process of reaching equilibrium. Presumably Rawls himself did – in the 
‘Presentation of Alternatives’ section of A Theory of Justice he names over a dozen 
‘conceptions of justice’, several of them containing multiple principles and one of 
them the extremely open ended ‘list of prima facie principles (as appropriate)’ 
(Rawls 1999, 107). While it would not be usual to provide such a lengthy list in 
writing, it is often useful to mention in passing your reasons for rejecting some of 
the principles that do not receive full discussion. 
The third step is to begin reflective equilibrium in earnest. You go through 
each principle, checking its prescriptions against your judgments. Ask 
yourself: what are the central cases for my topic? And what are the hard 
cases for this principle? The literature is, of course, an invaluable resource for 
finding such cases, but you will also come up with your own. Consider whether 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
thoroughly by wide reflective equilibrium. The latter type of constraint is essential as its functions cannot be 
replicated by wide reflective equilibrium proper. For instance, a logical impossibility should be cleared from 
our judgments once we consider relevant background theory, provided we are reasoning in favourable 
circumstances. But the effects of unfavourable circumstances, such as being drunk or ignorant of relevant 
political theory, will not be cleared by reflective equilibrium, as the epistemic value of the process is fatally 
undercut by our adverse physical condition or inability to draw on relevant arguments, principles, and 
theories. 
6 A fifth step would be to expose oneself to a wide and representative range of non-philosophical experiences, 
in order to offset formative biases. While I am attracted to this proposal, it does go beyond the method of 
reflective equilibrium as usually conceived; DePaul 1993 treats it as part of the separate ‘method of balance of 
refinement’. 
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you can accept the implications of the principle in each of these cases. It 
may be that initially the principle seems to have an unacceptable implication, but 
that on reflection you are willing to revise your judgment. This may particularly be 
the case where the principle is compelling in other cases. It may seem to explain 
why we think what we do in those cases, and extend in an appealing way to further, 
previously unconsidered cases. If you can accept a principle’s implications, either 
right away or on reflection, then it would seem that this principle is worthy of 
further consideration. If you can’t, you may set aside the principle for now, taking a 
note of the specific problems it faces. Repeat this procedure for each principle. 
The fourth step is to bring in devices of representation and background 
theories (for example, the original position and a theory of the separateness of 
persons, respectively). The most important devices of representation and 
background theories relevant to the topic should be considered, with particular 
devices and theories chosen on the basis of our judgments, which may themselves 
be revised during the process, even in response to normative principles. It may be 
that you can find a device of representation that seems, at least on reflection, to 
capture reasonable constraints on theory selection. It may even be that you have 
more confidence in it than you have in any principle. For instance, I personally 
find the difference principle less plausible than the original position from which 
Rawls controversially (Harsanyi 1975; Hare 1975: 102-107) derives it. In such 
cases, you may decide to focus on the principles chosen from the circumstances 
specified by the judgment-endorsed device, though you are still free to directly 
check the chosen principles against considered judgments (Mandle 2009: 40). 
Background theories have a similar, though less dramatic role, guiding principle 
selection but not outright replacing direct reference to judgments. Plausible 
background theories are used at this point to assess principles, with a particular 
focus on the principles found appealing in stage three. Devices of representation 
are also tested by background theories. For instance, if we accepted Sandel’s (1982: 
ch. 1) claim that the original position assumes that the self is prior to values, we 
might reject that device of representation as incompatible with our favoured non-
moral background theory even if it were compatible with our normative judgments 
(Gaus 1996: 105). 
Having considered principles, devices of representation, and background theories, 
the fifth step is to review this process. Now you know the specific 
challenges faced by the various principles, are there any revisions to these 
principles worth considering? Or do any entirely new principles now come 
to mind? If so, the third and fourth step should be repeated for these principles. If 
new or revised principles keep arising, many iterations of the third and fourth step 
may be necessary. The same repetition applies where revised or new devices of 
representation and background theories arise. Likewise, if you have not found any 
principle that you find acceptable in their implications, the third and fourth steps 
should be repeated. It may, however, be acceptable to limit the level of repetition 
due to time constraints. We do not all have months or years of philosophical 
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contemplation available to us! If all the steps are followed, the method will yield 
dividends even if the fifth step is attenuated, as may be necessary if writing a 
student essay, for example. 
The sixth step is to establish priority rules. This applies only where you have 
accepted multiple principles that may come into conflict with each other. Where 
you have such principles you need to consider cases of conflict, and decide how 
much importance each principle has in them. It may be that one principle seems so 
important that it should have absolute or ‘lexical’ priority over another. 
Alternatively, the principles may seem to have similar importance, in which case 
some kind of weighting should be decided. It could even be found that there are 
‘incompatible but equally justified overall accounts of the subject, thus supporting 
a kind of pluralism about the subject’ (Scanlon 2014: 78-79). 
The seventh step is the conclusion of the process, insofar as it has one. By 
this point you should have found agreement between principles and judgments – 
or otherwise concluded that this is impossible as there are no acceptable principles! 
Either way, your findings are only ever provisional, and should be considered 
permanently open to revision. 
  
6. An example 
I will now work through an example of reflective equilibrium on the topic of 
distributive justice, using the above step-by-step guide and my own considered 
judgments. I can obviously give only the scantest indication of my reasoning here, 
summarizing years of work in a few paragraphs. It is likely, furthermore, that the 
reader will disagree with me at numerous points. The example should nevertheless 
illustrate one way of reaching reflective equilibrium. 
The first step is to make sure that my judgements are considered. As I write this, it 
is 9.32 am, I had a good night’s sleep, I am aware of the danger of conflicts of 
interest when discussing the societal allocation of goods and am willing to 
counteract any resulting bias, and I have the motivation and desire to reach the 
correct decision. So it seems that, right now, I am making my judgments in suitable 
conditions. But as this test must be taken each time you use the method of 
reflective equilibrium, it must be repeated many times – indeed, many thousands of 
times in my case! 
For the second step I have to draw up a list of the main principles within this 
topic. Here’s my list: 
- The principle of utility 
- Rawls’ two principles of justice 
- Equality of outcome 
- Luck egalitarian principles (Arneson 1989; Cohen 1989) 
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- Democratic egalitarian principles (Anderson 1999) 
- The principle of priority (Parfit 2000) 
- The principle of sufficiency (Frankfurt 1987) 
- Right libertarian principles (Nozick 1974: Ch. 7) 
- Left libertarian principles (Steiner 1994) 
- The benefiting principle (Butt 2007) 
- The principle of need 
- The principle of desert 
- Communitarian principles (Sandel 1982) 
- Contractarian principles (Gauthier 1986) 
- Egoist principles 
The list is eclectic, and by design – the point at this stage is to avoid missing 
anything important, not to construct the most elegant inventory possible. Even so, 
other people’s lists would no doubt contain additional principles. 
With the third step I begin the reflective process by testing the principles and 
judgments against each other. Many principles can be set aside quite quickly. I find 
nothing of merit in ‘free for all’ egoist principles, and view the results of 
contractarian principles for people with low bargaining power utterly unacceptable, 
for instance. I do, by contrast, feel the pull of the principle of sufficiency, as I am 
very concerned by those who are very badly off in absolute terms. But I do not 
accept its implication that those who are just below the threshold of ‘having 
enough’ get absolute priority over those marginally above the threshold, who are 
only slightly better off (Arneson 2006: 28). I therefore conclude that the principle 
of priority better accommodates my concern with the absolutely badly off. 
Similarly, I am attracted to equality of outcome and democratic equality, as I am 
also concerned about inequality. But I am unhappy with democratic equality’s 
implication that large unchosen inequalities do not matter as long as individuals 
have equal social standing, and equality of outcome’s implication that, where some 
squander their equal share of resources, for instance by deliberately developing 
‘expensive tastes’ (Dworkin 2000: 48-59), they should be ‘compensated’ to restore 
equality, at society’s expense. I find that luck egalitarianism, which avoids such 
problems, fits with my judgments here better, but it has its own apparently 
objectionable implication that those who make bad choices that leave them in 
severe disadvantage will be ‘abandoned’ (Anderson 1999: 295-296). Outcome 
egalitarianism has no such implication. So at the end of third stage I have a 
provisional endorsement of prioritarianism, and an interest in egalitarianism that I 
am not yet convinced is well expressed in any principle. 
The fourth step sees the introduction of background theories (I set aside devices of 
representation). I will mention only one line of thought here, to illustrate how 
background theories might help us arbitrate between political principles. Some 
critics of luck egalitarianism have claimed (1) that it assumes that metaphysical 
libertarianism (the theory that free, non-causally determined human action is 
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possible) is true, and (2) that metaphysical libertarianism is false (Scheffler 2003: 
17-19). Were this true, I would have a background theory-based reason to reject 
luck egalitarianism in favour of outcome egalitarianism or democratic equality. 
However, on reflection I find reasons for rejecting both claims. While (2) is 
possible, we do not have adequate grounds for assuming this to be the case; 
political theorists would do better to proceed under the assumption that any of the 
main theories of free will (including sceptical views such as hard determinism) 
might be correct (call this the ‘thin theory’). Regarding (1), the standard, Arneson-
Cohen construal of luck egalitarianism does not after all assume any theory of free 
will, but is instead responsive to the morals and metaphysics of responsibility, in 
the sense that what counts as ‘chosen’ (and therefore as potential justification for 
inequality) depends on the best philosophical account. If metaphysical 
libertarianism is false, this just means that one way in which choice might have 
arise can’t actually happen. Luck egalitarianism would even be compatible with 
there being no way for true choice to arise. In that case, no inequality would be 
justified, a point which mitigates the ‘abandonment objection’ to luck 
egalitarianism mentioned in the previous paragraph (Knight 2015: 132-134). So 
luck egalitarianism is in fact admirably responsive to what I take to the most 
plausible background theory about free will, which is the thin theory (Knight 2009: 
ch. 5). Outcome egalitarianism and democratic equality are not responsive in this 
way, however, as they make the same prescriptions whether metaphysical 
libertarianism is true or hard determinism is true. This seems a significant flaw to 
me as, in my judgment, where a person has prima facie brought some hardship 
upon herself, we have more reason to assist her if her action were not a true 
exercise of free will, and less reason to assist her if action were a true exercise of 
free will. As luck egalitarianism seems to accommodate the most plausible 
background theory better than rival egalitarian theories, I accept it as part of my 
wide reflective equilibrium.  
For simplicity, I leave aside the fifth step. This brings us to the sixth step. I have 
found luck egalitarianism and prioritarianism to be in accord with my judgments. 
Now we need to decide on a rule to regulate conflicts between these principles. It 
seems that neither the ‘eliminate involuntary disadvantage’ (Cohen 1989: 916) goal 
of luck egalitarianism, nor prioritarianism’s concern with increasing absolute 
advantage (in particular, that of the worst off), should be assigned lexical priority, 
as I would be willing to give up a small improvement in either of these dimensions 
for a large improvement in the other. So my conception of justice of justice is a 
version of ‘responsibility-catering prioritarianism’ (Arneson 1999; see also Knight 
2009: ch. 6), where luck egalitarianism and prioritarianism are balanced against 
each other. Exactly what weighting, however, to give each of these principles is a 
rather tricky question, to be tested through considering a large number of cases, 
which I cannot do here.  
Suppose, though, that I find a favoured weighting, and reach the seventh and final 
step. Even then I can’t assume that weighting, or even the selection of principles, 
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to be settled for all time, as we can reconsider any aspect of the process at any 
point. As Rawls (2005: 97) cautions, ‘[t]he struggle for reflective equilibrium 
continues indefinitely’. 
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